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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
In just a few days, the Federal Communications Commission’s Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order1 (“RIF Order”) will take effect, repealing the 2015 net neutrality rules2 and restoring the 
light-touch regulatory framework that has historically governed most broadband providers. But 
supporters of the Obama-era common carriage rules are not going down without a fight. On May 
16, the Senate passed a Congressional Review Act resolution that would disapprove and block 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order.3 The passage was a victory for its author, Senator Ed 
Markey, and has been hailed by advocates as the “first step toward restoring net neutrality.”4 
 
Fortunately for consumers, the Senate bill resembles not so much new life breathed into the 2015 
rules, but rather its last dying gasps. To become effective, the resolution now must pass the 
House and either receive the president’s signature or survive his veto, which is unlikely to 
happen. And this is good, as the resolution would harm both broadband Internet providers and 
the consumers they serve. 
 
This Perspectives provides an overview of the Congressional Review Act and its application to 
the net neutrality debate. It also analyzes the likely effects of the CRA resolution if enacted into 
law. Because of the high hurdles to adoption, my sense is that this Congressional Review Act 
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effort is primarily political theater, designed to keep the issue in the headlines as the 
congressional midterm elections approach later this year. But this grandstanding comes at a cost: 
it delays the long-overdue legislative reform of the Communications Act for the Internet age. 
 
Indeed, while the FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order certainly is preferable to the 2015 
Open Internet regulations, bipartisan legislative reform is the only lasting solution to the net 
neutrality debate. So, unless net neutrality proponents are content to let the issue fester, it is 
imperative to stop the politicization of this issue that is poisoning the bipartisan well. 
 
The focus should be on trying to adopt compromise legislation. On net neutrality, consumers 
need solutions, not slogans.  
 
II. The Congressional Review Act: Overview 
 
In theory, the Congressional Review Act facilitates legislative oversight of agency rulemaking. It 
was designed to restore some of the control that Congress lost when the Supreme Court 
invalidated the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha.5 Prior to Chadha, hundreds of agency statutes 
contained legislative vetoes, which allowed one branch of Congress to invalidate particular 
agency action. Through the legislative veto, Congress kept some strings attached to the 
increasing number of decisions that it delegated to the growing administrative state. But the 
Court held that the veto constituted legislation, which had to go through bicameralism and 
presentment to be constitutional. So Congress passed the Congressional Review Act to re-create 
the legislative veto in a way that satisfied bicameralism and presentment, in accordance with 
Chadha. 
 
In practice, however, satisfying bicameralism and presentment is difficult to achieve. Absent a 
veto-proof majority, passage requires the agreement of the president, who is unlikely to 
invalidate one of his own agencies’ initiatives. For this reason, almost all successful 
Congressional Review Act resolutions have come during presidential transitions: once in 2001, 
when Congress repealed a Labor Department ergonomics rule passed in the twilight moments of 
the Clinton Administration shortly before George W. Bush took office,6 and an astonishing 
fifteen in 2017, during Donald Trump’s first year, to invalidate regulations adopted in the final 
months of the Obama Administration.7 The final two involved invalidation of rules enacted by 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (an independent agency) during the Trump 
administration but while the bureau was headed by a holdover Obama appointee.8  
 
But savvy politicians have discovered that even unsuccessful Congressional Review Act 
resolutions can be deployed for political purposes. For example, a congressional chamber in the 
hands of the president’s opponents can pass a resolution to register its discontent with the 
administration. During the Obama administration, the Republican-held Congress passed five 
joint resolutions that President Obama vetoed. The act also contains abbreviated review 
procedures that allow a minority of Senators to sidestep the power that Senate leadership 
typically exercises over the flow of legislation through the chamber,9 as happened in 2005 when 
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy forced the Republican-led Senate to vote on an EPA rule 
protecting coal and oil-fired power plants (a vote that failed to garner a Senate majority). While 
these votes are symbolic, they can be embarrassing for the administration and can force members 
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of Congress to take a position on a controversial agency action that they might otherwise prefer 
to avoid. 
 
III. The Congressional Review Act Case Study: Net Neutrality 
 
Senator Ed Markey’s effort to repeal the Restoring Internet Freedom Order illustrates both the 
mechanics and the limitations of the Congressional Review Act. The act requires agencies to 
report any rule to Congress before the rule can take effect.10 Major rules (those likely to have at 
least $100 million annual effect on the economy, or would otherwise have significant adverse 
effects on cost, prices, or competition),11 may not take effect until 60 days after this report or 
after publication in the Federal Register, whichever comes last.12 The Federal Register 
published the RIF Order on February 22, 2018.13 The FCC announced the order would take 
effect on June 11, 2018, following a required review by the Office of Management and Budget.14 
 
A. Saga in the Senate 
 
Senator Markey took advantage of the Act’s expedited Senate procedures to force a vote on a 
disapproval resolution. He introduced a CRA-complaint joint resolution of disapproval on 
February 27, 2018,15 which starts a 60-legislative-day shot clock to pass the resolution.16 
Markey’s resolution was referred to committee, where legislation disfavored by leadership often 
languishes. But the CRA provides that after 20 days, a CRA disapproval resolution can be 
discharged from committee upon petition by 30 senators.17 Senator Markey and 29 colleagues 
filed this petition on May 9. The CRA mandates that following a successful discharge petition, 
the joint resolution shall be placed on the calendar and a motion to proceed to consideration is in 
order at any time. Debate is limited to 10 hours (5 hours for each side), and the act prohibits 
amendments or filibusters, which could otherwise be used to prevent a final vote.18 
 
Although 30 senators could thus force a vote on the resolution, they cannot guarantee passage. 
Markey quickly secured the support of all 49 Democrats and one Republican, Maine Senator 
Susan Collins.19 But if all senators voted, this left him one vote shy of a majority. Throughout 
early 2018, Markey and net neutrality supporters campaigned under the hashtag #onemorevote to 
shine a spotlight on the resolution and encourage people to call their senators. Ultimately this 
proved unnecessary, as Senator John McCain’s ongoing treatment for brain cancer made passage 
inevitable. During his absence from the Senate, 50 votes were sufficient to form a majority.20 
With passage a mathematical certainty, the pressure came off Senate Republicans to hold 
opposition together. In the end, two additional Republicans (Senators John Kennedy and Lisa 
Murkowski) crossed party lines, and the bill passed 52-47. 
 
B. Implications of Passage 
 
Senator Markey’s surprising victory has prompted some speculation about what effect the 
resolution would have if enacted into law. DC think tank TechFreedom argues that because the 
Congressional Review Act by its terms applies only to “rules,” Markey’s resolution cannot 
repeal the reclassification portion of the order, which is a Declaratory Ruling.21 It’s a clever 
argument, one that turns on the definition of “rule”: “an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect.”22 But this definition, incorporated from the Administrative 
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Procedure Act,23 is notoriously vague, leading then-Professor Antonin Scalia to explain that “it is 
generally acknowledged that the only responsible judicial attitude toward this central APA 
definition is one of benign disregard.”24 
 
The Fifth Circuit has held that a Declaratory Ruling can be rulemaking or adjudication, 
depending on how the agency itself characterized the action and the ultimate product of that 
action.25 In a similar context, the Ninth Circuit has explained that rulemaking “affects the rights 
of broad classes of unspecified individuals” and is “prospective.”26 Here, the agency described 
the order as a “final rule” and adopted it via rulemaking’s notice-and-comment procedure. The 
order is also broad, affecting all broadband providers and their customers. On the other hand, the 
power to issue declaratory rulings resides in Section 554(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
which governs adjudication rather than rulemaking. TechFreedom’s argument is further 
complicated by the Congressional Review Act’s judicial review provision, which states that 
“[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial 
review.”27 Because of the dearth of successful repeal resolutions, the scope of this provision has 
not been tested. But it could preclude a challenge that the order in question is not, in fact, a rule. 
 
More likely, successful passage of the Markey resolution would invalidate the Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order and reinstate the 2015 Open Internet rules.28 While the current Commission is 
unlikely to enforce the reinstated rules vigorously, their reinstitution could harm consumers by 
dampening innovation in broadband and edge markets.29 Moreover, as Free State Foundation 
President Randolph May has noted,30 reinstatement would strip consumers of privacy 
protections. By classifying broadband providers as common carriers, the 2015 Open Internet 
Order stripped the Federal Trade Commission of jurisdiction to regulate these companies’ 
privacy practices, the way it regulates privacy everywhere else in the Internet ecosystem. The 
FCC attempted to fill in this gap with a heavy-handed opt-in privacy regime that Congress 
repealed in 2016 – via the Congressional Review Act. This means that the FCC is barred from 
enacting a new privacy rule “substantially similar to” the disapproved rules, leaving consumers 
unprotected. Like the judicial review provision, the scope of this restriction has not been 
judicially tested. It likely leaves room for the FCC to issue rules mirroring the FTC’s opt-out 
rules, though such rules likely would take at least several months to adopt. It seems 
counterproductive for Congress to remove privacy protections just as the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal has heightened consumer awareness of this issue. 
 
C. (Un)likelihood of Passage 
 
But, of course, these concerns are largely academic, as it is unlikely that the Markey resolution 
will be enacted into law. To satisfy the Congressional Review Act, the resolution must be passed 
by the House and either signed by the president or sustained against a presidential veto. But the 
Act contains few of the fast-track procedures regarding House of Representatives consideration 
that Senator Markey took advantage of to secure a Senate vote. Because the discharge petition 
passed the Senate, the Congressional Review Act provides that the resolution will be referred to 
the whole House rather than a committee.31 But otherwise “the procedure in that House shall be 
the same as if no joint resolution had been received” from the Senate, meaning Democrats alone 
cannot force a vote.32 This has proven to be the death knell of several disapproval procedures 
over the years, including Democratic Senator Byron Dorgan’s 2003 resolution disapproving the 
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FCC’s broadcast ownership rules33 and Democratic Senator Kent Conrad’s 2005 resolution 
disapproving mad cow quarantine rules,34 both of which passed the Senate but neither of which 
came up for a vote in the Republican-controlled House. To survive a House vote, the resolution 
would need at least 22 Republicans to support the measure – and that’s assuming all House 
Democrats vote for the resolution, which is not guaranteed.35 Moreover, although President 
Trump has not spoken much about net neutrality, it is highly unlikely that he would join 
Democrats to repeal an initiative of his own FCC chairman.  
 
IV. The Congressional Review Act as Political Theater 
 
But why spend such significant time and effort on a resolution that has virtually no chance of 
being enacted into law? While I do not doubt that Senator Markey and his supporters sincerely 
want to repeal the Restoring Internet Freedom Order, my sense is that the CRA effort is as much 
about politics as policy. Numerous pundits surmise that the Democratic Party has made net 
neutrality a key part of their strategy during the midterm elections. Senator Brian Schatz 
explained that “for millions of motivated and infrequent voters, this is a top issue.”36 And it 
resonates particularly strongly with younger citizens. Perhaps equally importantly, the issue may 
drive political contributions: Reuters notes that even as early as December of last year, “[s]everal 
Democratic candidates are sending fundraising appeals citing net neutrality.”37 The 
Congressional Review Act effort is key to this strategy, as it keeps the issue in the headlines, 
allowing Democratic lawmakers to, in one pundit’s words, “make political hay of the battle over 
net neutrality” throughout the campaign season.38 
 
This is perhaps unsurprising. The term itself has a surface-level appeal – who could be against 
neutrality? – and the issue creates almost a perfect storm of political opponents in the Trump 
administration side-by-side with cable companies, two targets that some people, reflexively, 
consider fair game. As Democratic strategist Jesse Ferguson explained, “Net neutrality is the 
latest data point for voters that the administration is more interested in doing what big companies 
want them to do, than what people think is in their interest…That’s a narrative that is politically 
toxic for Republicans.”39 
 
In a sense, I believe this use of a disapproval resolution as a political tool is largely consistent 
with the two-decade history of the Congressional Review Act, at least prior to the Trump 
administration. Disapproval resolutions rarely overturn agency action. Instead, they often were 
used to draw attention to politically volatile topics and to force members of Congress to state 
their positions by voting for or against the resolution. Senator Chuck Schumer alluded to this 
political rationale on the eve of the Senate’s vote, stating: “We're now one step away from 
allowing the American public to see where their elected officials stand on protecting their 
internet service.”40 While this strategic vote-setting was perhaps not Congress’s intent when 
passing the Act, it demonstrates that the Act may have unintended consequences.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Aside from the Congressional Review Act’s general import in other instances, the politicization 
of net neutrality in particular can have unintended consequences. The questions of what 
constitutes reasonable network management practices for Internet service providers, and when 
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vertical agreements are likely to enhance versus harm consumer welfare, are deeply nuanced 
questions that require technocratic expertise to solve. The reality is that broadband Internet 
networks are not neutral – and they never have been. Different applications have different 
susceptibility to congestion, and broadband providers need to manage traffic to enhance the 
overall user experience. The price mechanism can be a useful signal by app providers as to the 
relative susceptibility of a particular program to congestion. It can also create incentives for 
anticompetitive harm. These issues are not easily reducible to a sound bite or Twitter hashtag – 
and efforts to do so are likely to be misleading, as when a screenshot went viral at the height of 
the net neutrality debate purporting to show the balkanization of the Internet by Portuguese ISPs 
absent net neutrality protection. In fact, it showed nothing of the sort (particularly since Portugal 
has net neutrality rules in place).41 
 
The larger tragedy is that the effort to “make political hay” by politicizing net neutrality delays 
progress toward real, lasting solutions to important questions of American Internet policy. The 
bottom line is that the Communications Act says almost nothing clearly about how America’s 
primary communications regulator should regulate America’s primary communications 
networks. The Act was last amended significantly in 1996 and is long overdue for an overhaul – 
and to bring stability to this issue, that overhaul must be bipartisan. But keeping the issue alive 
through the midterms is inconsistent with finding compromise solutions. Last week, Republican 
Senator John Thune introduced a net neutrality bill that included a ban on blocking, throttling, 
and paid prioritization – the protections that lie at the core of the net neutrality movement. But 
Senate Democrats blocked the bill from coming to the floor, reportedly because they are wary of 
striking a hasty net neutrality deal.42  
 
Bipartisan legislative reform is the only lasting solution to the net neutrality debate. Even if the 
Democrats win majorities in the House and the Senate this fall, my sense is that it is unlikely 
they will be able to codify the rules in their entirety, for the same reason they almost certainly 
will not pass the Markey resolution: because President Trump will not sign it. So, unless net 
neutrality proponents are content to let the issue fester and gamble on the 2020 presidential 
election, it is time to stop the politicization of this issue so that compromise becomes possible. 
 
On net neutrality, consumers need solutions, not slogans. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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